

Semi-valid Input Coverage for Fuzz Testing


Petar Tsankov, Mohammad Torabi Dashti, David Basin

Institute of Information Security

ETH Zurich

Fuzz Testing


Testing a PDF Viewer



Are the PDF files displayed correctly?


Fuzz Testing

Fuzz-testing a PDF viewer testing




Are there any **security faults**?
(e.g. memory errors)


Semi-valid Inputs




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
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
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
Semi-valid Inputs



Semi-valid Inputs




Semi-valid Inputs



- **Entirely-invalid inputs** get blocked.
- **Semi-valid inputs** are essential for fuzz testing.

Coverage Criteria



- Low **coverage** hints at **missing test cases**.
- No existing **coverage metric** tailored to fuzz testing.
 - existing metrics do not tell us how thoroughly we have tested with semi-valid inputs.

Coverage for Fuzz Testing

Semi-valid Input Coverage (SVCov)

- Constraints define whether an input is valid or not.
“The third byte is the XOR of the first two bytes.” (C1)

Semi-valid Input Coverage (SVCov)


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Input Domain


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
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
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
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
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
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$$\mathbf{SVCov} = \frac{\# \text{ covered semi-valid partitions}}{\# \text{ total semi-valid partitions}}$$


SVCov Properties




$$SVCov = \frac{\# \text{ covered semi-valid partitions}}{\# \text{ total semi-valid partitions}}$$

- ✓ Independent to test generation method.
- ✓ Valid inputs do not contribute to SVCov.
- ⚠ The usefulness of SVCov depends on the constraints.
- ⚠ 100% SVCov does not guarantee that the tests reveal all faults.


Using SVCov




Using SVCov




Using SVCov



Using SVCov



Using SVCov



Case Study

Research questions:

- **RQ1: Feasibility**

Can we precisely define the semi-valid inputs of the SUT and efficiently measure SVCov?

- **RQ2: Relevance to coverage**

Does measuring SVCov provide meaningful information on how to improve a test set's coverage?

- **RQ3: Relevance to discovering faults**

Does increasing SVCov result in discovering additional faults?

Case Study: Artifacts

- **Test subject:** OpenSwan
 - IKE implementation for Linux, 600K LOC.
 - Input specification: RFC2407, RFC2408, RFC2409.
- **Fuzzing tool:** SecFuzz
 - Mutation-based fuzzer for security protocols.
- **Test oracle:** MemCheck
 - Detects memory errors.
- **SVCov checker**
 - Currently supports only IKE.




RQ1: Feasibility

- We focused on “**must (not)** sentences” in the RFCs:
 - *“If a message contains a proposal payload, then the proposal’s next-payload field **must** be set to 2 or 0.”*
- The specification of constraints for IKE is straightforward:
 - Number of constraints: **217**.
 - Time to extract the constraints: **8 person hours**.
- Negligible overhead for measuring SVCov:
 - Time to check all constraints for each test case: **41 ms**.
 - Time to execute a test case: **1000 ms**.

RQ2: Relevance to Coverage

SVCov (initial)




- Many constraints are **violated**, but **not uniquely**.
- Some constraints are **never violated**.

RQ2: Relevance to Coverage


SVCov analysis

- **Problems in the fuzzing tool**
 - Imprecision in the “insert payload” fuzz operator.
 - Insert random numbers limited to [0, 100].
 - ...
- **Missing valid inputs**
 - No valid inputs for IPv6 and ASN.1 X500 DN.
- **Redundant constraints**



RQ2: Relevance to Coverage


SVCov (after improvements)



- SVCov improved from 41% to 89%.
- All constraints are violated.
- 9% of the constraints are not uniquely violated.


RQ3: Relevance to Discovering Faults

- A previously unknown **security fault** revealed after improving SVCov.



- The **valid input** was missing in the first experiment.
- The **test case** belongs to a semi-valid partition.

SVCov Contributions



Easy-to-use coverage
for fuzz testing



Pinpoint subtle problems
in fuzz testing

grammar-based
white-box
fuzzing
mutation-based
model-based
random


Independent of the
fuzz-testing technique



Promising initial
empirical results


Backup Slides

Redundant Constraints




- Constraint **C1** is redundant.
 - removing C1 does not change the set of valid inputs.
- Constraint **C1** cannot be uniquely violated.
 - Any input that violates C1 also violates C2.

Missing Valid Inputs



- To violate a constraint we need an input that satisfies the constraint non-vacuously.

Case Study: Setup



- We measure and report SVCov of the **fuzzed inputs**.
- Measure SVCov of the **valid inputs** to check for missing inputs.